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In any society, education is a major vehicle for the transmission of ideas, 
attitudes, and beliefs.  This means that control over educational content 
and access to classrooms can become valuable commodities in a conflict.  
Education – and especially the teaching of history – can perpetuate 
negative judgments about the “other,” engendering hostility and 
aggression among the young, and firing up the fever to go to war.1 
 
A. PURPOSE 
According to P. W. Singer, the extremist madrassas described by President 
Musharraf run a curriculum where, 
Hatred is permissible, jihad allows the murder of innocents, and the new 
heroes are terrorists.  Martyrdom through suicide attacks are also extolled, 
and anti-western speeches are committed to memory.  The students are 
uneducated, young, dependent on the schools, and cut off from contact 
with their parents for years at a time, and thus highly susceptible to being 
programmed toward violence.  These students from this minority of 
madrassas are regularly sent abroad to serve in conflicts in Kashmir, 
Afghanistan, Chechnya, and a number of other wars decided by the school 
leaders as part of the jihad. In addition, the foreign students of the 
madrassas return to their home states with a violent outlook and sow the 
seeds for conflict elsewhere.2 
The madrassa system is not unique to Pakistan, but actually exists in most Muslim 
countries ranging from Mali to Malaysia.  The graduates of these schools all face a 
similar obstacle - how to use their superb knowledge of the Koran in a modern world 
which expects a more rounded education.  This is the one of the problems facing new 
madrassa graduates.  The traditional madrassa, teaching a deep understanding of the 
Koran, provide the graduate with few valuable job skills sought after in a modern world.  
The individuals must then turn to their network of cohorts, other unemployed or 
underemployed graduates, for assistance.  The lack of opportunity, and perception of 
                                                 
1 Pamela Aall, “Education in the Muslim World,” USIP, Apr 2005, 1. 
2 P. W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,” Foreign Policy 
Studies, Analysis Paper # 14, Nov 2001 http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/singer/200111.htm 
(accessed 21 Feb 2007). 
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being left behind as the world marches on, only increases their collective frustration and 
anger with modernity in general, and the West in particular.  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Pakistan’s educational institutions known 
as madrassas.3 These schools operate outside the government sponsored public school 
system, and the elite private schools.  There has been much speculation as to the linkage 
between these schools and terrorism, yet the alleged link has been little studied.  The 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) aims to capture or kill terrorists who threaten the national 
interests of the United States, yet very little resources are being expended to stem the 
indoctrination of students and their subsequent recruitment into terrorist organizations. 
The evidence in the media and even from President Musharraf indicates that some of the 
madrassas impart a radical view of Islam.4  These schools teach their students to kill non-
believers, including fellow Muslims, in order to promote their intolerant brand of Islam.  
Therefore the GWOT is destined to be an interminable battle since the cadre of militants 
is constantly being replenished by the madrassas. 
There has been much confusion in academic circles as to the exact number of 
madrassas operating in Pakistan. A recent study at Harvard University indicates that the 
madrassa system in Pakistan is not cause for concern and claims that madrassa 
enrollment figures cited in the popular press are inflated and do not use any verifiable 
data.5 This is a central problem when examining the madrassa system.  A World Bank 
report by Tahir Andrabi et al., estimates that the actual number is a mere 1 percent of all 
students enrolled in Pakistan.6  With regard to the number of madrassas in Pakistan, 
President Musharraf believes that, 
Of Pakistan’s 150 million Muslims, only a small fraction are extremists.  
The problem is that they are so vocal they receive a disproportionate share 
of attention, whereas the peace-loving, moderate majority is so silent and 
meek that it gives the impression of being a minority.  There are many 
                                                 
3 In contemporary Arabic, the word madrassa means center of learning; the Arabic plural form is 
Madaris, but for the sake of clarity I will use the English equivalent plural form – madrassas. 
4 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, New York, Free Press, 2006, 313. 
5 Reuters, “Madrassa Maths,” The Economist, 19 May 2005 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~akhwaja/media/madrassa/Economist.pdf (accessed 21 Feb 2007) 
6 Tahir Andrabi, Das Jishnu and Khwaja I. Asim, “Private Schools in Pakistan: Catering to the Elite?” 
The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2003.  
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countries around the world that intertwine religious and public schools 
successfully, and there is no reason why Pakistan cannot do the same.7 
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
To understand the underlying causes and motivations of terrorists, one must 
understand the background of the perpetrators.  What chain of events leads an individual 
or group to turn to violence or to harbor a deep hatred for the freedoms of the West? The 
United States cannot expect to win the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by simply 
eliminating the terrorists on the “battlefield”. The recruitment of terrorists must be cut off 
at the source.  The key to resolving the scourge of terrorism is to address the 
philosophical, economic, and cultural forces driving the phenomenon.  The madrassa 
educational system in Pakistan is one such institution that requires change in order to 
provide its students with a viable future, and prevent them succumbing to the lure of 
terrorism.  Additionally, it is important to understand the reasons behind the explosive 
growth in the madrassas in Pakistan in the last 20 years.  The madrassa system is not 
unique to Pakistan, and theoretically, a similar mushrooming in the numbers of schools 
could occur in other Muslim countries, leading to an increased chance of militancy by 
virtue of the numbers alone.  With regard to the educational sector reforms currently 
under way in Pakistan, it will be useful to ascertain the success or failure of these reforms 
in crafting future reform packages for other nations facing similar challenges. 
The debate over the impact of Pakistan’s madrassas in producing extremists has 
been ongoing, particularly since September 11, 2001.  The following thesis is a 
contribution to this continuing debate.  Like any issue, the spread of terrorism cannot be 
attributed to any one single cause.  It is tempting to point to the Islamic schools as the 
source of militant Islam, and surmise that shutting down these schools will resolve the 
madrassa problem and ultimately stem the flow of terrorists. However, the issue is 
extremely complex and must be considered carefully by both the United States and 
Pakistan. 
                                                 
7 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, New York, Free Press, 2006, 313. 
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The preponderance of information available on the madrassas indicate that some 
of them are, in fact, a major problem and require substantial reforms in order to update 
their respective curriculums, broaden their outlook, and abolish the tendency toward 
militancy.  The view of the Pakistani Government is interesting and highlights the 
challenges it faces when dealing with the madrassas. 
There is absolutely nothing in the Madaris curriculum that can be deemed 
as promoting or encouraging militancy, not to mention terrorism.  [The] 
radicalism that we see in some Madaris in Pakistan today is an extraneous 
phenomenon brought into Madaris by some international and domestic 
political actors who want to use the religious capital and manpower of 
these Madaris for their own objectives.8 
It is clear then, that the Government of Pakistan readily admits a problem with the 
madrassas, though it emphasizes the fact that the overwhelming majority are simply 
involved in traditional Islamic studies. The statement on international actors referred to as 
responsible for using the madrassas to further their own political and religious agenda is a 
thinly veiled reference to Saudi Arabia. 
The radical minority of madrassas, estimated by multiple sources at 10–15 percent 
of all madrassas, teach an extremist interpretation of Islam. While it is impossible to 
ascertain the exact number of schools teaching militancy, the estimate of one in ten is 
widely accepted.  In these schools, hatred is permissible, jihad allows the murder of 
innocents, and the new heroes are terrorists.9  Martyrdom through suicide attacks are also 
extolled, and anti-western speeches are committed to memory.  The students are 
uneducated, young, dependent on the schools, and cut off from contact with their parents 
for years at a time, and thus highly susceptible to being programmed toward violence.  
These students from this minority of madrassas are regularly sent abroad to serve in 




                                                 
8 Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, “Education Sector Reforms (ESR),” 2002. 
http://www.embassyofpakistan.org/pb6.php (accessed 3 Oct 2006). 
9 Arthur MacMillan, “Schools Hijacked to Teach Hatred,” Scotland on Sunday, 17 Jul 2005.  
http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=1641432005 (accessed 5 Jan 2006). 
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school leaders as part of the jihad. In addition, the foreign students of the madrassas 
return to their home states with a violent outlook and sow the seeds for conflict 
elsewhere.10 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed thus far lends itself easily to stratification based on where 
the various authors’ analysis believes the blame lies for the current situation and, 
consequently, where the Government of Pakistan’s efforts should focus.  All three 
schools of thought on the subject of Pakistani madrassas agree that some of the schools 
teach militancy. The first group clearly sees Saudi Arabia’s sponsorship of Islamic 
Fundamentalism as one of the main sources of the problem.  The second group asserts 
that the problem lies with the poor state of the curriculum and the political persuasion of 
many Ulema —religious scholars—leading these institutions.  Finally, the last group 
argues that the key issue is the dismal socioeconomic situation many of the 
underprivileged poor find themselves in modern Pakistan.  To address the phenomenon 
of Pakistan’s modern day madrassas, one must understand the root causes of the problem 
of militancy in these schools.  The Government of Pakistan has taken some steps to 
rectify the madrassas issue, but it is unclear whether these reforms have had any major 
impact.  This is one of the questions this thesis seeks to answer.   
The first school of thought regarding the madrassas argues that they are indeed a 
problem and that in some cases they do promote sectarian thought, but that the problem 
stems from the Saudi Arabian funding of these schools, more than with the 
socioeconomic environment created by the Pakistani Government.  For example, the 
noted scholar Vali Nasr believes “Saudi Arabia has been the single biggest source of 
funding for fanatical interpretations of Islam, and that the embodiment of this 
interpretation in organizations and schools has created a self-perpetuating institutional 
basis for promoting fanaticism across the Muslim world.” He further believes that “there 
is no other state that spends as much money at ensuring conservatism and fanaticism 
                                                 
10 P. W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad.” Analysis Paper 
# 14, Nov 2001, 3. 
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among Muslims.”11 Therefore, to resolve the problem of alleged militancy in the 
madrassas, one must focus on the root cause: the spread of Wahhabi extremism from 
Saudi Arabia.  The argument is that the current educational reforms and the Government 
of Pakistan’s other efforts are misguided and should in fact be tailored towards stemming 
the external funding of these schools and not in changing the curriculum or registering 
the schools. Ultimately, this thesis will find that this school of thought is the most 
compelling argument, particularly since five years have passed since Pakistan’s 
Education Sector Reforms were enacted, and little has changed on the ground. 
The second school of thought asserts that the problem of the Pakistani madrassas 
lies with the evolving curriculum and political persuasion of the Ulema in recent years.  
For example, Professor Hussain Haqqani of Boston University examined the change in 
the teachings at the madrassa he attended, from when he was a child, to the present day.  
He was taught that the farangi (Europeans) are evil, and behaving like them is the 
beginning of the journey to Hell.  He was taught that the Communists are evil because 
they denied the existence of God.  He had a verse instilled in his memory that his religion 
was the best and that the belief in God was his salvation. Haqqani revisited the site of his 
childhood education as an adult and found that the lesson had continued to teach a hatred 
of the ways of the West but now advocated changing the West by force or Jihad.12  The 
spread of madrassas around the world and the prospect of year upon year of militant 
graduates is cause for alarm.  To address this issue, the Government of Pakistan has the 
onerous task of censoring or replacing the Ulema, and creating an atmosphere conducive 
to learning by promoting tolerance vice instilling the students with a hatred of the West 
and a willingness to resort to violence in the cause of Islam.  Professor Akbar S. Ahmed, 
former Pakistani Ambassador to London, addresses this harsh, intolerant view of Islam 
and the intolerance toward women.  He states that the Taliban, which are a product of the 
Sunni madrassas funded by Saudi Arabia, has a distorted zeal for Islam, which 
violated two basic tenets of Islam in a manner calculated to cause offence 
to many in and outside the country. Firstly, their discrimination against 
women and the beatings that they administer, contrast with the gentleness 
                                                 
11 Vali Nasr, “Saudi Time Bomb?” PBS, 25 Oct 2001, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/interviews/nasr.html (accessed 27 Jan 2006).   
12 Hussain Huqqani, “Islam’s Medieval Outposts,” Foreign Policy No. 133 (Nov – Dec 2002), 58–64. 
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and kindness of the Prophet of Islam towards women. His famous saying 
that `heaven is under the feet of the mother' sums up the traditional 
attitude of Islam to women. Secondly, the harshness of the Taliban 
towards minority groups … is also against the spirit of Islam which 
encourages tolerance. The minorities … have been discriminated against 
and treated with violence. This suggests an ethnic attitude rather than a 
religious one, although it may come under the guise of religion.13 
With regard to the madrassas, he believes that they use Islam as a vehicle to drive 
change locally, but also try to change the entire world order. This issue highlights the 
need for a better understanding of the driving force behind this aggressive stance.  
Professor Ahmed believes that this aggression is an indication of the crossroads facing 
Muslim leaders today—the choice between modernity and militancy. 
While the often Westernized nationalist leaders of the post-independence 
period sought to hold on to the state and consolidate it; the new leaders 
hope to destroy it as a legacy of the West and then re-create it in an 
Islamic mold. The former sought survival in a transitional world; the latter 
demand purity in an impure one.14 
The final school of thought argues that the source of the madrassas problem lies 
with the socioeconomic situation many of the underprivileged poor find themselves in 
modern Pakistan.  They suggest that the madrassas are not the main source of the “Jihadi 
culture” in Pakistan and blame the dismal state of the education system in general.  
According to official figures, 60 percent of the population of Pakistan cannot read or 
write, due mainly to the fact that Pakistan devotes just 2 percent of its GNP to 
education.15   Some authors believe that the madrassas do in fact play a role in militancy 
and violence, but also point out that the madrassas have a key place in Pakistan’s 
religious and social life.16  Robert Looney provides a clear economist’s view of the 
direction ahead.  He believes that educational reform is the key to remedy the current 
                                                 
13 Akbar S. Ahmed, “Islam’s Crossroads — Islamic leadership,” 
http://www.islamfortoday.com/akbar02.htm  (accessed 10 Feb 2007). 
14 Professor Akbar S. Ahmed, “Islam's Crossroads — Islamic leadership,” 
http://www.islamfortoday.com/akbar02.htm (accessed 10 Feb 2007).  
15 International Education Projects: Pakistan, “Education Sector Reform Assistance (ESRA) Program, 
RTI International,” http://www.rti.org/page.cfm?objectid=57EBAC2E-38F1-4CBF-8E4E4574F9DDA7CC 
(accessed 26 Jan 2007).  
16 “Pakistan: Madrassahs, Extremism and the Military,” ICG, 2002, Asia Report 36.  
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situation and that this reform could be financed by the international community.17  Gene 
Sperling also touts this goal of universal education, when he notes that in 2000, 180 
nations committed to the goal of universal education by 2015.  He notes, however, that 
this goal will not be reached because the goodwill and the financial support are 
unbalanced and would need an additional $9.1 billion each year to reach the goal set for 
2015.18 The solution of this school of thought is clear: to resolve the madrassas issue, the 
Government of Pakistan must create a viable and more attractive alternative to  
the free schooling offered at the Madrassas.  
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will begin by examining the rapid change that has occurred in 
Pakistan’s madrassas since the 1970s.  Several major events, both domestic and 
international in nature, caused the madrassas to change from their initial mission of 
imparting Islamic knowledge to that of becoming training grounds for holy warriors or 
mujahideen, as was the case during the Soviet-Afghan War.  This thesis will trace this 
evolution and describe how these changes had a direct impact on where the madrassas are 
today.  Following this historical overview, the thesis will then examine the madrassas in 
Pakistan today in order to ascertain whether they are indeed “hotbeds” of Islamic 
terrorism.  This examination will look at the students and teachers, the curriculum, and 
the opportunities available to the graduates upon completion of their schooling. Once this 
has been addressed, the thesis will then investigate why the United States is concerned 
about the madrassas and what has been done thus far to reform them.  This section will 
look at the recent reports on militancy in Pakistan’s madrassas, particularly since the 
September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, and the underground bombings in 
London in July 2005. In addition, the thesis will examine reports of madrassa students 
currently involved in the Kashmir conflict and the ongoing War on Terror in Afghanistan.   
Of particular interest is the funding of the madrassas.  This thesis will examine the 
sources of funding coming from states beyond Pakistan’s borders.  This section will 
                                                 
17 Robert Looney, “A U.S. Strategy for Achieving Stability in Pakistan: Expanding Educational 
Opportunities,” Strategic Insights, Vol. I, Issue 7, Sep 2002, 257. 
18 Gene Sperling, “Educating the World,” New York Times, 22 Nov 2001. A39.  
9 
cover the ideological and political driving forces behind this funding stream, particularly 
in the case of Saudi Arabia.  How much money is being funneled into Pakistan, by 
whom, and for what ultimate purpose?  What steps have been taken to eliminate this 
funding, and how much of an impact will this have on the madrassas?  The final portion 
of this section will look at the reforms enacted by Pakistan since 2000 and investigate 
whether they have achieved their objectives.  To conclude, the thesis will recommend 
prudent courses of action for both the United States and Pakistan with regard to madrassa 
reform specifically, but also will propose a new policy direction for international 
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II. HOW PAKISTAN’S MADRASSAS HAVE CHANGED OVER 
THE YEARS 
A. THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE MADRASSAS 
The original intent of the Islamic schools in the tenth century was to educate the 
population on Islam, but also to impart knowledge of the sciences.  This religious 
education also served to groom the next generation of religious leaders.  The traditional 
madrassas in Egypt, for example, had curriculums which included religion, but also 
courses in linguistics, rhetoric, logic, mathematic, medicine, astronomy, and chemistry.  
Pamela Aall of the U.S. Institute for Peace explains how this changed over the centuries.  
For centuries, Islamic religious institutions considered “revelation” the 
ultimate source of knowledge, hence bringing Ijtehad, or human 
interpretation, to a close.  The devaluation of “reason” and the subsequent 
exclusion of religious scholars and institutions from the process of 
modernization during the last century turned madrassas into fervent 
guardians of religious dogma and anti-modernism.19 
The madrassas were not always this way and have unfortunately strayed from the 
unique centers of learning they once were. For example, with regard to the recitation of 
the Koran, often seen as typifying this type of school, Uzma Anzar eloquently explains 
that,  
For Muslims, the Koran is the perfect word of God, sacred and therefore 
cannot be changed. It should be memorized from start to finish. Once a 
person has memorized it, he/she must reflect on these verses and have a 
detailed understanding of its meaning and interpretation over the lifetime. 
A person who has mastered it would carry the knowledge of Islam in 
his/her heart and spread the word to the ones who encounter him/her.20  
The first madrassa was established in Egypt around 1000 A.D. In many ways it 
resembled modern educational institutions with a diverse curriculum and teachers for 
different subjects, including astronomy, philosophy, and architecture.21  These madrassas 
flourished in the Golden Age of Islam, yet began to decay due to political infighting 
                                                 
19 Pamela Aall, “Education in the Muslim World,” USIP, Apr 2005, 10. 
20 Uzma Anzar, “Islamic Education. A Brief History of Madrassas,” Mar 2003, 
http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/madrassah-history.pdf  (accessed 10 Feb 2007).  
21 Ibid. 
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among Muslim rulers and, of course, the Crusades.  This loss of power by the Muslim 
elite resulted in the Ulema of the madrassas shunning the pursuit of knowledge, since it 
had not achieved the desired result, and a decision to return to the basics of learning.22  
Centuries later, the Muslim world was further incensed by the colonial Europeans 
encroaching on Muslim lands, and their imposition of a European style of teaching. 
Uzma Anzar describes this phenomenon as the dichotomy of the education system, where 
the elite were chosen to attend these schools and run the machinery of the colony, and the 
poor were relegated to a curriculum devoted to religious education.23 
 
B. GENERAL ZIA’S INFLUENCE (1977–1988) 
The recent spread of “modern” madrassas in Pakistan began under General Zia 
Ul-Huq.  Zia came to power through a military coup on July 5, 1977, by removing the 
man who appointed him Chief of Staff of the army, President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.  In his 
first address to the nation, Zia asserted, “Pakistan, which was created in the name of 
Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam.  That is why I consider the 
introduction of [the] Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.”  His 11-
year rule was to change the face of Pakistan, and return the country to its original design 
as an Islamic state as envisioned by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.   
The Islamization of education under General Zia and the levying of Islamic taxes 
had broad-reaching effects on the political landscape of Pakistan. The funds raised by the 
zakat (taxes), one of the five pillars of Islam, were used to finance the traditional 
madrassas.  This funding enabled the government some level of control over the 
curriculum of these institutions.  The funding, coupled with the state policy of making 
courses in Islam obligatory for students in all schools, caused a rapid growth in the 
number of madrassas during the 1980s. The influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and 
the government funding caused a mushrooming in the number of madrassas.  This growth 
afforded the Ulemas greater power and importance in Pakistani society, particularly the 
strict Deobandi sect that had originated in Northern India.  General Zia quickly 
recognized that he was losing control over the madrassas and began requiring support 
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from the madrassas in return for government funding.  The Ulemas realized that this 
would limit their authority and independence, and began relying on other sources of 
finance to continue to operate without government assistance and oversight.24 In an 
attempt to gain support from religious groups, President Zia began to administer a 
formalized zakat (Islamic religious tithe – 2.5 percent) process which was a departure 
from the tradition of leaving the donation of money to the individual.  Money was now 
automatically deducted from bank balances and dispersed at the local level to institutions 
deemed worthy of support by religious leaders, creating new incentives for opening 
religious schools.25 
 
C. SUPPORTING THE AFGHAN WAR (1979–1989) 
The U.S. also had a large part to play in the spread of the madrassas in Pakistan.  
Under President Jimmy Carter, the U.S. established a $500 million fund to prepare 
Mujahideen to fight against the occupying Soviet forces in Kabul.  This figure eventually 
increased to $4 billion and the project was given the title “Operation Cyclone.”  It 
primarily aimed at promoting Jihadi culture in Pakistan, and the establishment of Islamic 
seminaries was an integral part of the operation.26   
The impact of the Afghan War cannot be underestimated in the rise of the 
madrassas. Zia’s international popularity had never been high, particularly with the 
United States.  Washington had a cyclical friend–foe relationship with Pakistan since 
1947. Following the Iranian revolution, the U.S. looked toward Pakistan as a potential 
ally to replace the Shah of Iran as a bulwark against Soviet regional expansion.  
However, Zia’s execution of the former president, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, brought him 
international condemnation. Before Zia’s popularity could slip any further in 
Washington, the Soviet Army marched into Kabul and changed the equation entirely.  
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With increased concern at Soviet proximity to the Persian Gulf, Pakistan was considered 
one of the guarantors of free access to the energy resources of the Gulf. 
In 1979, the U.S. began pouring aid into Pakistan to train Mujahideen to fight the 
occupying Soviets in Afghanistan.  The madrassas became their vehicle for this 
education, and hundreds of these schools were established along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border to train young Afghans to fight the Soviets.  Not all in Washington 
were onboard with this initiative. Some looked at the long-term implications of providing 
weapons to guerrillas as tantamount to creating a future problem, one larger than the 
threat of Soviet expansion.  Some argued that the United States should adopt a lower 
profile and let Zia obtain his own weapons and funding from the Islamic countries, 
China, or Western Europe.27  In retrospect, he was incorrect in the assumption that the 
possibility of Indian aggression was more dangerous to Pakistan than the reality of a 
Soviet threat to Afghanistan and, by extension, Pakistan. Interestingly, many of these 
recommendations from 1980 are applicable today, particularly his conclusion that 
Pakistan must be encouraged to liberalize its internal political system and move toward 
rapprochement with India. 
Unfortunately the repercussions of this policy are still being felt in the region 
today—the militants, who were trained and funded by the U.S. are now the very ones that 
reside on the “most wanted” lists of the U.S. military.  As an example, on May 4, 2006, 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the founder and leader of Afghanistan’s Hizb-e-Islami and a 
former Afghan prime minister, pledged support for Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri and promised to carry on the fight alongside them against the 
“infidels.”  It is ironic that he was the beneficiary of $600 million in U.S. aid during the 
Afghan war against the Soviets during the 1980s.28    
President Zia understood that Washington would agree to any terms in order to 
fight a proxy war against the Soviets.  He recognized his position of strength in the 1981 
negotiations, and demanded a high price to achieve the mutual goal of forcing the Soviets 
out of Afghanistan.  Zia wanted Washington to stop badgering Pakistan on the nuclear 
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issue, cease its insistence on a return to democracy, and funnel all training funds through 
the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). In response to these demands, President Reagan 
agreed to all three items and pushed through a $3.2 billion aid package to be spread over 
five years.29 In addition, in May 1981, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a 
six-year waiver on sanctions barring aid to Pakistan.  This was a dramatic about-face 
from two years previous, when all aid to Pakistan had been cancelled as a result of its 
nuclear ambitions, and stands to underscore the pendulum-like relationship between the 
two countries.30   
There was unprecedented financial cooperation between the United States and 
Pakistan during the Afghan War.  President Reagan funneled more than $2 billion (of the 
$3.2 billion aid package) to the Afghan Mujahideen via General Zia’s ISI.  This amount 
was matched by another $2 billion from Saudi Arabia, China, and the Gulf States.  At the 
time, the policy of supporting the Islamic militants against Moscow’s forces was 
obviously proving to be an effective strategy—at least in the short term.  Indeed, the 
effectiveness of the strategy was also its undoing, since the madrassas it established 
continued to inculcate students in the efficacy of jihad long after the Soviets had 
retreated. 
During the war, the flow of money through the ISI ensured that it was channeled 
to the appropriate Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, but it also ensured the preeminence 
of the ISI on the Pakistan political stage.  In 1971 there were 900 madrassas in Pakistan, 
but by 1988 this number had increased to 8,000 with an additional 25,000 unregistered 
religious schools clustered along the Pakistan–Afghan border.31  President Reagan 
wanted the Soviets out of Afghanistan as part of his “roll back Communism” pledge, but 
for Zia, the goal was less well defined.  He wanted the Soviets out of Afghanistan, but 
only if the future government of Afghanistan was thoroughly pro-Pakistan and would 
allow for the immediate repatriation of the millions of refugees that were crippling 
Pakistan’s ailing economy.  President Zia recognized that the flow of money would cease 
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as soon as the conflict ended, and so was not eager for a swift victory for the Afghans 
fighting the Soviets.  By the end of the 1980s, Pakistan had become the third-largest 
recipient of aid, after Israel and Egypt.32  The $3.2 billion U.S. military and economic aid 
program to Pakistan in 1982 was followed by another $4 billion for the period from 1988 
to 1993.33 
The number of Afghans seeking refuge in Pakistan, in the wake of the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, was staggering. By December 1990, UNHCR estimated that 
there were over 6.3 million Afghan refugees in neighboring countries, including 3.3 
million in Pakistan, and three million in Iran. By this time, Afghans had come to 
constitute the largest refugee population in the world.34  After 20 years and a massive 
repatriation effort, the Afghan refugee situation still defies a solution.35  A census 
conducted in 2006 by the Pakistani Government with assistance from UNHCR showed 
that more than 3 million Afghans are still living in Pakistan. Some 280,000 Afghans 
returned home from Pakistan so far in 2006, bringing to more than 2.5 million the 
number that has gone back to Afghanistan from Pakistan since early 2002.36  Many of 
these refugees populated the classrooms of the madrassas located along the border, and 
given the dire situation in the camps, most likely considered themselves lucky to have 
access to any form of education. 
 
D.  THE SAUDI ARABIAN INFLUENCE AND THE SPREAD OF 
WAHHABISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 
The increase in the number of Pakistani madrassas has been shown to be a 
product of U.S. and Saudi funding during the Afghan War.  However, the responsibility 
for the continued flourishing of these schools in Pakistan and around the world can be 
laid squarely at the feet of the Saudi Arabian Government’s active efforts to spread of 
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Wahhabism.  David Kaplan of U.S. News and World Report wrote in 2005 that the 
Saudis are estimated to have spent up to $75 billion since 1975 to expand Wahhabism, 
worldwide.  His investigations revealed that  
The Kingdom has funded hundreds of mosques, schools, and Islamic 
centers abroad, spreading the once obscure sect of Islam widely blamed 
for preaching distrust of non-believers, anti-Semitism, and near-medieval 
attitudes toward women. Saudi-funded charities have been implicated in 
backing jihadist movements in some 20 countries.37 
This promotion of Wahhabism by Saudi Arabia is not limited to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, but actually is a worldwide phenomenon.  For example, the noted historian 
William Dalrymple observed that in 2005, Saudi Arabia stepped up funding of madrassas 
in Africa, and in Tanzania alone they have been spending $1million a year building new 
madrassas.  In Mali, about a quarter of primary school-aged children attend madrassas.38  
Lee Wolosky, Co-Director of the Independent Task Force on Terrorism Financing, also 
agrees.   In a recent Senate testimony, he stated that 
a sizeable portion of these madrassas are financed and operated by 
Pakistani Islamist political parties such as Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI, 
closely linked to the Taliban), as well as by the Pakistani expatriates and 
other unknown foreign entities, many in Saudi Arabia.39 
In all these instances, it appears that the money trail leads to Saudi Arabia as the 
main external source of funding for these schools.  The harm in all of this can be 
synopsized in the following comment made by Professor Vali Nasr of the Naval 
Postgraduate School in a PBS interview following the September 11 attacks, 
In order to have terrorists, in order to have supporters for terrorists, in 
order to have people who are willing to interpret religion in violent ways, 
in order to have people who are willing to legitimate crashing yourself into 
a building and killing 5,000 innocent people, you need particular 
interpretations of Islam.  Those interpretations of Islam are being 
propagated out of schools that receive organizational and financial funding 
from Saudi Arabia. In fact, I would push it further: that these schools 
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would not have existed without Saudi funding. They would not have 
proliferated across Pakistan and India and Afghanistan without Saudi  
funding. They would not have had the kind of prowess that they have 
without Saudi funding, and they would not have trained as many people 
without Saudi funding.40 
Clearly, Saudi Arabia bears a large part of the responsibility for the continued 
survival of Pakistan’s madrassas.  Despite President Musharraf’s efforts, the Government 
of Pakistan has no means to monitor precisely how much money is coming from external 
sources, since the majority of madrassas are not registered with Islamabad.  The clerics 
are obviously unwilling to divulge the magnitude or sources of funding they receive.  On 
the domestic side, recent estimates conclude that however substantial the funding, it 
seldom exceeds the 25 percent of the total needed to operate these schools; thus three-
quarters of madrassa funding comes from abroad.41 
The United States and Saudi Arabia appear to be locked in a diametrically 
opposed strategy with regard to Pakistan’s madrassas. The U.S. has currently pledged 
$100 million to Pakistan as part of the Education Sector Reforms that began in 2000.  
Although commendable in its goals, the amount does little to resolve the issue.  Yes, 
schools have been opened to compete with the madrassas, and improvements have been 
made to the public school system infrastructure to wean students from the madrassas, but 
the underlying cause has not been addressed.   The problem is one of funding, not the 
comparatively meager amount dedicated to education reform in Pakistan’s fiscal budget, 
nor the $100 million pledged by the United States.  The problem lies on the other side, in 
the massive funding of madrassas coming from remittances and, on a much larger scale, 
from the Gulf countries, most notably Saudi Arabia.  U.S. policy makers must address 
how much money is flowing into the system before deciding on an appropriate plan of 
action to limit the influence of the madrassas in Pakistan. It appears counterproductive to 
spend U.S. taxpayer money to reform these schools, while at the same time other nations 
are spending vastly more money to ensure the madrassas remain unchanged.  Something  
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has to change, either the U.S. policy of financial aid, or the Saudi policy of financial 
support, otherwise the madrassas will continue to have a radical element that produces 
extremists.   
The people of Saudi Arabia adhere to the Salafist tradition of Islam, also known 
as Wahhabism. This is a blinkered and intolerant view of Islam that promotes violence, 
even against other Muslims. The Wahhabists have been linked to the takfiris, those who 
follow an exclusivist view of Islam and therefore brand other Sunnis, and especially 
Shias, as unbelievers and hence viable targets for attack.  A primary function of this 
belief is the need to export it to other parts of the world and encourage the mirroring of 
the Saudi Arabian system elsewhere.  It is enlightening to examine the Saudi educational 
system briefly, in order to understand the potential direction of those madrassas in 
Pakistan linked to extremist ideology. In a recent letter to the Saudi daily newspaper, Al-
Watan, a senior Education Ministry official declared that  
There is an organized ideological stream that includes key [Education] 
Ministry members, and that it poses a concrete danger to the ideological 
security in the educational environment.  The danger of this extremist 
stream lies in its distortion of the perception of nationalism, in its 
dissemination of ideas supporting violence, and in its sabotage of the plans 
of the moderate national leadership within the Ministry.42   
This official was clearly concerned about the extremist leanings of teachers in 
Saudi Arabia’s schools, and it is logical to infer that the same lessons are being taught in 
Pakistan’s madrassa since they are funded directly from the Kingdom.   
The question of Saudi funding of educational institutions worldwide, in order to 
spread its form of Islam, is a difficult one to answer categorically; however, some 
numbers do exist.  For example, during the 1975 to 1987 timeframe, the Saudi Arabian 
Government spent $48 billion, or $4 billion per year, on “overseas development aid,” 
which grew to over $70 billion by the end of 2002.  These sums do not include private 
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donations that are also distributed by state-controlled charities.43 The magnitude of the 
effort can also be seen in a report by the Saudi Government from 1999, which proudly 
commented that  
The Al Haramain Foundation had founded 1,100 mosques, schools, and 
Islamic centers in Pakistan and elsewhere, printed 13 million Islamic 
books, and employed 3,000 callers (proselytizers). Over the same period, 
IIRO [International Islamic Relief Organization] had completed the 
construction of 3,800 mosques, spent $45 million on Islamic education, 
and employed 6,000 teachers and proselytizers, while World Assembly of 
Muslim Youth (WAMY), for its part, provided $26 million in aid to 
students and founding mosques.44 
Much of the money leaving the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does so under the guise 
of charitable organizations, thereby giving the Saudi Government plausible deniability 
when it comes to questions of terrorist financing. This funding obviously runs counter to 
many of the interests of the United States in the region, and clearly undermines any 
reform efforts driven by the governments of both Washington and Islamabad.  
Indeed, the issue is such that in a report to the United Nations a year after the 
September 11 attacks, the conclusion reached was that, 
In the case of al-Qaida, surviving myths such as the absence of money in 
terrorist organizations, the belief that money could extensively be 
transferred using informal or offshore procedures, or the unwillingness to 
face the Saudi ideological and financial source of fundamentalism, turns 
the war against terrorism financing into an equivocal fight that may elude 
or undermine its long-term objectives.45 
Naturally the foreign policy of the United States towards Saudi Arabia is 
extremely complex and has implications for continued domestic energy sources imported 
from the region. In the broader context, the ongoing war in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions also complicate the equation when considering future policies.  Consider that 
Vice President Cheney flew 18,000 miles round trip to Riyadh in November 2006 for a 
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brief meeting with King Abdullah, only to be warned that should the U.S. withdraw from 
Iraq, “the Kingdom will find itself forced to interfere.”46 But, according to the Iraq Study 
Group (ISG), a bipartisan examination of the situation in Iraq published in November 
2006, Saudi Arabia is already involved in Iraq: 
Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments help 
facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by providing basing and over-
flight rights and by cooperating on intelligence issues.47 
The War on Terror has made some great strides in combating terrorism thus far.  
Yet these victories are tactical in nature and in most cases do not impact the strategic 
level battle that has yet to be fought.  Alex Alexiev, a senior fellow at the Center for 
Security Policy, puts it like this:  
We have attempted to come to terms with the psychology behind the 
terrorists’ murderous fury, yet refuse to examine systematically, let alone 
do something about, the effect and implications of daily indoctrination of 
hundreds of thousands if not millions of Muslims around the world into a 
hate-driven cult of violence. Similarly, we have tried and often succeeded 
in disrupting the terrorists’ tactical organizational structures and 
communications networks, but have paid scant attention to the huge 
world-wide infrastructure of radical Islam which breeds and nourishes 
violence.48 
Some have argued that the reason the Saudi Arabian government spend such vast 
sums of money on exporting Wahhabism is to draw the attention of militant Islamic 
groups away from the Saudi royal family.49  The establishing of militant schools at a 
great distance from the Kingdom, insulate the royal family, and cause madrassa graduates 
to feel obliged to their benefactor for the free room, board, and education provided.  For 
example, in the birthplace of the Taliban, the “Darul Uloom Haqqania, Mullah Omar’s 
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Pakistani alma mater, a plaque announces that the room was A gift of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.”50   
Therefore, the United States must address Saudi support of education worldwide 
and not simply in Pakistan.  The expansion of the concept that all who do not believe in 
the Wahhabi brand of Islam are enemies and must be killed is a cancer that is spreading 
worldwide.  The United States must demand that Saudi Arabia cease and desist from all 
future funding of these schools and provide full access to data regarding their funding of 
these institutions.  Unfortunately, given the current climate, this is unlikely to occur.  In 
fact, the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia is so heavily entrenched in oil 
holdings that even when fifteen of the nineteen perpetrators of the September 11 attacks 
were known to be Saudi citizens, the U.S. did nothing to censure the Kingdom.  As a 
matter of fact, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, one out of every three of the 
original 300 detainees sent from the battlefields of Afghanistan to the confines of 
Guantanamo Bay were Saudis.51  
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III. THE MADRASSAS TODAY 
There are 200,000 jobless degree-holders in this country [Pakistan].  Mark 
my words—a more extreme form of the Taliban is coming to Pakistan.  
The conditions are so bad.  The people are so desperate.  They are waiting 
for a solution that will rid them of the feudal-army elite.  The people want 
radical change.  We teach them in the madrassas that only Islam can 
provide the justice they seek. 
—Javed Paracha , founder of the two largest madrassas in NWFP52 
 
A. THE STUDENTS:  HOW POVERTY AND ECONOMIC NECESSITY 
FUEL ATTENDANCE 
The number of students enrolled in these schools has been estimated at 1.5 million 
of Pakistan’s total student population.53  Many scholars believe that roughly one in ten of 
these madrassas are linked to extremism, which suggests that there could be one hundred 
thousand to two hundred thousand potential recruits for Islamist terrorist organizations in 
Pakistan’s madrassas alone.54 
No country better exemplifies the vicious cycle that poverty causes illiteracy and 
illiteracy causes poverty better than Pakistan.55  With regard to education, Pakistan finds 
itself in a Catch-22 situation.  The high poverty rates provide the madrassas with a steady 
stream of students, eager for a free education, and in some cases the food and lodging 
provided.  The schools, in turn, graduate students with little to offer, and a very limited 
skill set.  And so the cycle repeats itself.  P. W. Singer aptly compares the madrassas to a 
pyramid scheme, whereby the schools graduate individuals who are almost 
unemployable, and therefore dependent on others for support.  The only jobs they are 
qualified for is at a mosque or another madrassa.  This is one of the factors that explains 
why the madrassas continue to spread across Pakistan.  Singer explains, “Either more 
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schools must open, thus expanding the problem, or the young men are sentenced to 
perpetual unemployment, or even worse.  Many of the radical schools unsurprisingly 
encourage students who cannot find jobs to fulfill their spiritual obligations instead by 
joining radicalized conflict groups.56  
This poverty cycle is very difficult to break.  The low literacy rates in Pakistan are 
a major problem, as is evident in the table below.  In 2005, one out of every two 
Pakistanis was illiterate.  This situation does not auger well for continued economic 
expansion and development, and highlights the need for educational reform at both the 
madrassas and public school levels. 
 
 
Table 1.   Literacy Rates in Pakistan 2004–2005 
From: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005–2006.57 
 
A large investment in human capital is required for Pakistan to continue its 
current economic growth.  Pakistan spends very little on education compared to other 
countries in the region.  In 2000–2001, Pakistan’s educational funding was below 2 
percent of the national budget and rose to a mere 2.2 percent in 2004–2005.  These 
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figures indicate the level of priority Pakistan assigns to education and do not compare 
favorably with other expenditures, particularly defense, which is estimated at 3.9 percent 
in 2005.58 
 
Table 2.   Pakistan’s expenditure on Public Education, 2000–2006 
From: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005–2006.59 
 
 
Table 3.   Pakistan’s Unemployment Rate 2005–2006 
From: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005–2006.60 
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Pakistan’s rising population should also be considered when examining the future 
of the country’s education system.  As evident in the tables below, Pakistan, like other 
countries in the region, has undergone a population explosion.  Pakistan’s population has 
increased fivefold in the last 50 years; bringing it to the sixth largest population after 
China, India, the U.S., Indonesia, and Brazil.61  The table below indicates that in 2005 
nearly three million people were added to this population.  In order for Pakistan to absorb 
this large population and create an environment of continued economic development, it is 
clear that education must become a higher priority. 
 
 
Table 4.   Pakistan’s Population Growth 2005. 
From: Economic Survey 2005.62 
 
The issue of poverty reduction is a complex one.  Education specialist Andrew 
Coulson points out an interesting facet of international economics when he states:  
Every percentage point of duty we impose on poor countries, every 
shipment of goods that never happens because quotas have been reached; 
every $100,000 of subsidies to domestic producers drives hundreds if not 
thousands of families in poor nations into the arms of “free” schools.63 
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This is the crux of the madrassa problem. Due to a combination of history, 
geographic location, and limited resources, many poor rural Pakistani students have few 
viable options in the quest for a meaningful education and therefore cannot break the 
cycle of poverty which haunts them. 
An ethnographic study in 1994 indicated that nearly half the students joined 
madrassas for economic reasons, 41 percent for social reasons, and only about 6 percent 
for religious pursuit.64  The distinguished Dr. Tariq Rahman of Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad, conducted a study of madrassa enrolment in December 2002 and January 
2003.  He found that three-quarters of the students belonged to the poorer sections of 
society.  In addition, he found that 61 percent of the teachers belong to the same socio-
economic group.65  The report therefore concurs with P. W. Singer’s analogy to the 
pyramid scheme referenced earlier.  Dr. Rahman concluded, 
In essence the madrassas seem to provide sustenance to these 
economically weak individuals. They are performing the role of providing 
welfare in a country which does not have a social security net. This being 
so, the influence of madrassas on rural people and the poorer sections of 
the urban proletariat will continue to increase as poverty increases.66 
 
The madrassa problem in Pakistan is tied to the uniquely intertwined political, 
economic, and religious factors of that nation.  It therefore cannot be resolved until the 
underlying poverty is reduced, so as to reduce the flow of students by providing viable 
alternative educational opportunities. 
Many have argued that the solution to the madrassa problem, and by extension—
curriculum reform—is to wean the students from the madrassas back to the mainstream 
public school system.  The idea is that this would solve the madrassa registration issue 
and give the government much-needed oversight of the education sector.  Unfortunately, 
this plan, albeit well-intentioned, also has serious flaws.  One of the main reasons so 
many students are forced to attend the madrassas is the failure of Pakistan’s school 
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system to provide an adequate number of teachers and schools, particularly in the rural 
areas.  Hence, with little alternative available, parents send the children to the madrassa 
to get some semblance of education.  As has been discussed before, the lure is increased 
by the fact that many of the madrassas provide free room and board the student body—an 
enticement for large, low-income families.   
Furthermore, Pakistan’s public school system uses a curriculum that is also 
questionable in its content.  In a watershed publication entitled The Subtle Subversion—
the State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan, the authors found that “the curricula 
and the officially mandated textbooks … have contained material that is directly contrary 
to the goals and values of a progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan.”67  In 
addition, the analysis found that the seven most significant problems in the current 
curricula and textbooks were:  
• Inaccuracies of fact and omissions that serve to substantially distort the 
nature and significance of actual events in our history. 
• Insensitivity to the existing religious diversity of the nation. 
• An incitement to militancy and violence, including encouragement of 
Jehad [sic] and Shahadat. 
• Perspectives that encourage prejudice, bigotry, and discrimination 
towards fellow citizens, especially women and religious 
minorities, and others toward nations. 
• A glorification of war and the use of force. 
• The omission of concepts, events, and material that could encourage 
critical self-awareness among students. 
• Outdated and incoherent pedagogical practices that hinder the 
development of interest and insight among students.68 
Recall that this is Pakistan’s public school system curriculum, not the madrassas 
that is under discussion.  This indictment appears to undermine the USAID effort to wean 
students from madrassas into the public school system, since it also is apparently in need 
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of reform.  Consider the public school system’s infrastructure problems delineated in the 
table below.  It is therefore apparent that both Pakistan’s public schools and Pakistan’s 
madrassas are in desperate need of reform. 
 
 
Table 5.   Schools without Basic Facilities in 2004–2005. 
From: Economic Survey 2005–2006 69 
B. THE CURRICULUM: INDOCTRINATION OF XENOPHOBIA 
It is instructive to examine some of the textbooks historically used in the 
madrassas to understand the type of lessons being taught there today.  During the Afghan 
conflict, millions of refugees were housed and received a rudimentary education at 
madrassas in Pakistan.  These schools were located throughout Pakistan, but the more 
militant among them were located close to the Afghan border, where incursions against 
the Soviets were successful due to the ability to retreat to the relative safety of Pakistan.  
Today, the madrassas strung along the mountain villages from Waziristan in the south to 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the north, provide similar access and 
retreat for militants fighting with the Taliban against NATO forces.   
Ironically, the textbooks used by these schools in the past and possibly still to this 
day, were written and printed in the United States at the University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, Center for Afghanistan studies.  These schools were funded by USAID 
originally, and later were funded by UNOCAL, and indoctrinated thousands of young 
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Muslims on the importance of Jihad.70  One of the more notorious examples of a math 
problem for fourth-grade children was the following question:  
The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second…. If a 
Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid 
aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the 
bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead.71   
Pakistan’s own Sustainable Development Policy Institute’s (SDPI) 2005 report on 
curriculum also found numerous references that created a positively xenophobic 
atmosphere in the classroom.  For example, one textbook reads, “The religion of the 
Hindus did not teach them good things”; another teaches the child that the “Hindu has 
always been an enemy of Islam”; yet another reads, “the Hindus lived in small and dark 
houses,” and, as a final example, consider the story used in an Urdu textbook that has a 
Hindu character explain that “Hindus please the goddess Kali by slaughtering people of 
other religions at her feet.”72  Clearly, this message could not be expected to engender an 
open outlook and a willingness to understand and accept the differences between 
religious faiths.  The authors of the SDPI report also noted that as recently as 2004, the 
Curriculum Wing expressed its disapproval of a class IV textbook on Social Studies 
because the book did not contain enough material on jihad.73 
Table 6 below indicates Pakistani student and teacher responses to critical 
questions regarding Islam and Pakistan’s future.  The madrassas exhibit a much higher 
inclination towards resolution of the Kashmir issue and Pakistan’s longstanding 
animosity toward India through violent means. 
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Table 6.   Student and Teacher Responses to Survey, 2003. 
 
The majority of the 11,000 madrassas in Pakistan caters to the poorer segment and 
offer education in the Koran, Hadith (sayings of the Prophet) and Arabic, the so-called 
Dars-e-Nizamia curriculum.74  This curriculum is outdated, limited in its reach, and badly 
in need of an overhaul.  For example, each year, thousands of Pakistani children learn 
from history books that Jews are tight-fisted money-lenders and that Christians are 
vengeful conquerors—one textbook tells kids they should be willing to die as martyrs for 
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Islam.75  In another case, this time in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which 
is governed by supporters of the ousted Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan, the 
federally approved Islamic studies textbook for eighth grade teaches students they must 
be prepared “to sacrifice every precious thing, including life, for jihad.”76 The textbook 
for adolescent students says Muslims are allowed to “take up arms” and wage jihad in 
self-defense or if they are prevented from practicing their religion.  “When God’s people 
are forced to become slaves of man-made laws, they are hindered from practicing the 
religion of their God,” the textbook reads.  “When all legal ways in this regard are closed, 
then power should be used to eliminate the evil.”77  These references further underscore 
that reform is required at the public level of education as well as at the madrassas. 
 
C. THE TEACHERS: A PYRAMID SCHEME 
In Pakistan’s education system, access to schools is limited in remote areas, 
especially for girls and post-primary students. Facilities often are minimal or inadequate, 
and the quality of education is poor, primarily relying on rote memorization and 
repetition led by many teachers with little more than an elementary education themselves. 
Limited pre- or in-service training is available for teachers, whose salaries are low and 
who enjoy little prestige.78 
Clearly, the curriculum reforms have to face the major obstacle of winning over 
the teacher cadre at these schools in order to enact the reforms. Simply put, the teachers 
receive Saudi funding to teach a Wahhabist-like curriculum, and if that curriculum 
changes, thousands of teachers with little other employment opportunities will be out of 
work. So it is fair to say that the level at which the Ulemas embrace what is widely 
considered to be an American-influenced curriculum is directly linked to their livelihood 
and will therefore be greeted with staunch disapproval.  This does not even begin to take 
into account the larger dimensions of the problem. 
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A recent joint study by Harvard University and the Academy of Education 
Planning and Management in Pakistan revealed that math scores for students in grades 
four and five rose with the level of their teachers’ level of education.79 As such, it is 
critical to improve teacher training through regulation and government oversight. 
Standardization requirements and certification processes also need to be established 
before improvements will be evident.  The current efforts of the University of Nebraska 
at Omaha’s Center for Afghanistan Studies appear to provide a solid foundation for 
teacher-training in Afghanistan.  Perhaps the training of teachers from Pakistan could be 
modeled on this same structure. 
 
D. THE GRADUATES: LIMITED OPPORTUNITY AND INADEQUATE 
SKILLS 
It appears that the new generation of madrassas has become more concerned with 
religious indoctrination than imparting any meaningful skills to the student body.  The 
curriculum is a good starting point in understanding the evolution that has occurred from 
the traditional school to the new, more dangerous iteration.  Needless to say, there are 
larger factors at play than simply addressing the curriculum of these institutions.  The 
preponderance of evidence suggests that a madrassa graduate will find difficulty in 
obtaining meaningful, gainful employment and will be forced to remain within the 
madrassa system as an aide in a mosque or, at the extreme end of the spectrum, as a 
militant modern-day mujahideen.  As P. W. Singer bleakly points out, “despite going to 
school for eight years, the graduates of most madrassas have no acquaintance with 
needed subjects like economics, science, or computing.  Consequently, most madrassa 
students graduate school outside the mainstream of the twenty-first century.80  In addition 
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madrassa graduate also create animosity and social division by highlighting the 
increasing gulf between those in the private education system and those taught the 
blinkered madrassa worldview.81  
                                                 
81 Samina Ahmed, “Combating Terrorism through Education – the Near East & South Asian 
Experience,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, 19 Apr 2005, 
http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2005/AhmedTestimony050419.pdf (accessed 21 Feb 2007) 
35 
IV. WHY THE WEST IS CONCERNED ABOUT PAKISTAN’S 
MADRASSAS 
The CIA World Fact Book describes Pakistan as “an impoverished and 
underdeveloped country, [which] suffered from decades of internal political disputes, low 
levels of foreign investment, and a costly, ongoing confrontation with neighboring 
India.”82 Aside from these problems, or in some cases, as a result of them, Pakistan’s 
education sector is one of the poorest funded of any country in Asia.  In fact the U.N. 
Development Program’s 2004 Human Development Report assigned Pakistan the lowest 
“education index” of any country outside Africa.83  Pakistan’s private school system is 
the most efficient in the education sector in producing students with a viable skill set for 
the modern world, but is beyond the reach of the majority of Pakistanis. The public 
school system, funded by less than 2 percent of Pakistan’s GNP, is in a dismal state and 
is responsible in part for the 50 percent literacy rate among men and even lower figure 
among women.84 The third educational institution is the madrassa, which operate, by and 
large, outside the regulation of the Islamabad government.   
The difficulty presented by the madrassas in Pakistan is that we know so little for 
certain about their inner mechanisms.  Each school outwardly appears the same 
regardless of what is being taught inside.  Neither the U.S. Government nor the 
Government of Pakistan are adequately equipped to answer the questions on what is 
being taught in each madrassa, and cannot simply rely on calculated guesswork to 
provide the answer.  President Musharraf addressed this concern during a visit to the 
United States and had the following to say,  
There are hundreds of thousands of mosques in Pakistan and it is very 
difficult to check all of them. Yet we are using every possible means 
including law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies and locals to 
monitor the activities of mosque preachers. Friday sermons are being 
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observed and those found guilty of spreading hatred are being arrested and 
charged in the anti terrorist courts.85  
As many madrassas are collocated with a mosque, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the President Musharraf’s words can be extended to the seminaries. 
The number of madrassas teaching a distorted view of Islam is unavailable.  In 
fact, the number of madrassas in operation at any given time is also unknown since 
registration with the government has not occurred.  However, in the words of President 
Musharraf,  
We have approximately 14,000 madrassas in Pakistan with abut 1 million 
poor students. Eighty percent of these madrassas fall under the Wafaq ul 
Madaris (“trusts for madrassas”). Their strength lies in the fact that they 
generally provide free board and lodging to their students.  In that sense 
they are strong providers of human welfare.  Their weakness, however, is 
that they generally impart religious education only, and a few of them get 
involved in terrorism and extremism.  In general most are characterized by 
religious rigidity and intolerance of other sects. Such a system generates 
thousands of young men annually who can become only clerics in a 
mosque. The government has decided to fund only those madrassas that 
register and teach all the subjects specified by the board of education.86 
This is all very well for President Musharraf to say, but as discussed earlier, the 
madrassas of Pakistan receive much of their funding from sources outside the country.  
So the plan not to fund those madrassas teaching a curriculum restricted to the Koran and 
the Hadith would largely have no effect.  
It is clear that the madrassas became a problem once they were hijacked by the 
Pakistani Government and the United States as a political tool to provide foot soldiers in 
the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, the question remains, why did these 
schools continue to survive long after the fall of the Soviet Union and well into the 
twenty-first century?  The events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, 
coupled with the London Underground Bombings of 2005, have caused many to look to 
the madrassas of Pakistan for answers.  Even today, there are Pakistani madrassa students 
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and graduates fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s ineffective madrassa reform 
contribute to the West’s concern about these religious institutions in Pakistan. 
 
A. THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
Pakistan’s madrassas have received much media coverage following the 
September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, and many policy makers questioned 
whether the madrassas could be responsible for producing militant graduates with an anti-
Western outlook ripe for terrorist recruitment.  Perhaps the most famous graduate of 
Pakistan’s madrassa is Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 
and still a hunted man for his association with Osama Bin Laden.  Mullah Omar was seen 
as the epitome of the worst-case scenario for madrassa graduates, and the United States 
continues to offer a $10 million reward for information leading to his capture.87 The 
debate over whether the madrassas continue to misguide young impressionable 
Pakistanis, and lead them toward militancy, is still ongoing.   Some have countered the 
argument that the madrassas have anything to do with terrorism against the West, and 
believe that at most the students in the madrassas in Pakistan may hold an anti-American 
viewpoint, but are unlikely to threaten America directly.88 Many have argued that the 
madrassas are not the crux of the problem with Pakistan’s education system, and that they 
have received undue attention primarily as a result of the September 11 attacks on the 
United States.89  The argument is that since the madrassas constitute only 1 percent of the 
education establishment in Pakistan, perhaps the focus should be on the dismal state of 
public education, which constitutes the other 99 percent.  This reasoning is logical since 
there have been no direct ties between the 9/11 attacks and the Pakistani madrassas in and 
of themselves, but in the eyes of many Westerners, they are guilty by association.  
However, it is generally recognized that the Pakistani madrassas were the institutions 
which spawned the Taliban. Since the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden, 
the man responsible for the horrors of September 11, was sheltered and assisted by them, 
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many saw the link between the madrassas and Al Qaeda.  Since the attacks, there has also 
been much speculation as to the link between the madrassas of Pakistan and international 
terrorism.  The porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan caused some U.S. policy 
makers to blur the lines in analyzing the source of the problem. 
In October 2003, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld asked his 
senior staff, “are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every 
day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying 
against us?”90  The SECDEF’s concerns are valid and based firmly in the reality that 
many of the Taliban leadership were graduates of the madrassa system.  Much of the 
Taliban leadership was trained at just one madrassa: the Haqqaniya at Akora Khattak, 
between Islamabad and Peshawar.  The director, Sami ul-Haq, still proudly boasts that 
whenever the Taliban put out a call for fighters, he would simply close down the 
madrassa and sends his students off to fight.91 
The allegations that some madrassas covertly teach a militant form of Islam, 
training the students to interpret jihad as a spiritual path diametrically opposed to 
Western values, is accurate in some cases.  The difficulty of the problem and critical 
importance lies in determining which madrassas are bona fide educational institutions 
and which are involved in spreading militancy.  The complexity of the madrassa 
phenomenon is also affected by the tendency to consider a madrassa graduate “ripe” for 
recruitment by Al Qaeda or other terrorist organization.  This intuitively logical step is an 
inaccurate portrayal of the facts on the ground. Although none of the September 11 
terrorists were members of the Taliban, the madrassas became linked with terrorism in 
the months that followed, and the association stuck.  For Western politicians, a certain 
type of education, such as the exclusive and rote learning of the Qur’an that some 
madrassas offer, seemed to be the only explanation for the inculcation of hate and 
irrationality in Islamist terrorists. 
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B. THE LONDON UNDERGROUND BOMBINGS JULY 7, 2005 
Following the terrorist attacks on the London underground system, three of those 
arrested were found to have spent a short time at a madrassa in Lahore, leading 
investigators to again question the linkage between Pakistan’s madrassas and terrorist 
attacks.92  However, the differentiation between a strategic level international terrorist 
and a tactical level potential recruit must be made.  A recent study found that it was the 
rare terrorist who studied exclusively at a madrassa and only one terrorist (in a study of 
the five worst terrorist attacks against the West) managed to transition from madrassa to 
university, suggesting that madrassas should not be part of a profile of a terrorist capable 
of launching a significant anti-Western attack.  Masterminding a large-scale attack thus 
requires technical skills far beyond those provided by a madrassa education.93 
As recently as January 2, 2006, Pakistan had to back off from its hard-line 
approach regarding madrassa reform. The connection between one of the perpetrators of 
the suicide bombings in London in 2005 and a madrassa in Pakistan has brought renewed 
interest in reforming the schools. New York Times journalist Salman Masood points out 
that after the 9/11 attacks, President Musharraf pledged to reform the madrassas in return 
for generous aid packages and debt relief from the United States and other Western allies.  
He has been unable to deliver because the religious radicals can use the requirement to 
register the madrassas to depict the President of being a stooge for the West.  According 
to the Minister for Religious Affairs, Ijaz ul-Huq, 5,000 of the estimated 12,000 schools 
have not registered with Islamabad.94 This highlights the delicacy of dealing with 
political Islam and President Musharraf’s almost untenable position regarding the issue of 
madrassa reform. The two assassination attempts on President Musharraf in 2003 indicate 
that the extremist factions are willing to go to any length to ensure their independence 
and continued survival. 
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C. MADRASSA GRADUATES FIGHTING TODAY 
Hamid Gul, the former Chief of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) 
believes that it is unreasonable to expect Pakistan to successfully close the border with 
Pakistan.95  In a recent interview he noted, 
This border is impossible to seal. The Russians could not seal it. The 
British could not seal it in 98 years of their rule over this area. The 
Russians stayed there for 11 years and they could not seal it. How can you 
seal a border that is 2,400 kilometers long? And it is very difficult 
geography, very difficult terrain.96 
He is most likely correct in his assessment.   He is joined in bleak outlook for the 
Afghanistan conflict by Aslam Beg, Pakistan's military chief of staff between 1988 and 
1991.  In a recent interview, Beg explained that he saw the jihadists fighting what they 
believe to be a worthy cause, to protect the sovereignty of Muslim states occupied by 
foreign troops.  He believed that the West is fighting a war they just do not understand. 
He concluded that “there is nothing more that the NATO or the ISAF or the Americans 
can do in Afghanistan. NATO will be defeated. The time has come to cut a deal.” 97  
The cross-border incursion of fighters from Pakistan into Afghanistan is not a new 
phenomenon.  In October 2006, a madrassa in Bajaur Agency, Pakistan, was hit in an air 
strike, killing 82 people.  The Director General of Inter Services Public Relations, Major 
General Shaukat Sultan, said that the madrassa in Bajaur was imparting suicide attack 
training and that the administration had been warned before the operation to stop its 
activities.98  Following three days of protests in Islamabad, President Musharraf called 
the attack on Bajaur Agency an attack on militants, which further infuriated the 
protestors.  In one instance, an American flag was burned to oppose perceived U.S. 
involvement in the attack.99 Hamid Gul is convinced the Americans bombed the 
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madrassa in order to stop the signing of an agreement that Musharraf brokered with local 
militants in the Bajaur district.100 This agreement would have been similar to a previous 
agreement President Musharraf signed in North Waziristan in September 2006, which 
was widely viewed as a capitulation by Islamabad to the pro-Taliban militants 
responsible for the deaths of 350 Pakistani Army troops over the past five years.101  
According to Declan Walsh of The Guardian,  
The Bajaur madrassa was run by Tehriq-e-Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi 
(TNSM), a jihadist group with strong al-Qaida links that considers Dargai 
a stronghold. During the 1990s TNSM tried to impose Taliban-style rule 
in pockets of the province and sent thousands of tribesmen to fight 
American troops in Afghanistan in 2001. After being banned by the 
Pakistani government in 2002, the group became an underground host 
organization for al-Qaida.102 
Three months later, in January 2007, 42 Pakistani soldiers were killed in a suicide 
bomb blast that was later claimed to be revenge for the Bajaur attack.103  This attack may 
be the beginning of a wider conflict emerging in Pakistan and will most likely be in direct 
proportion to Musharraf’s attempts to reign in the frontier regions to the west. 
Much of this violence is due to the Afghan refugee problem that still haunts the 
region.  In a recent U.N.-sponsored meeting on refugees in Islamabad, Pakistani and 
Afghan authorities announced that four refugee camps holding 300,000 people and 
located in Pakistan’s border provinces will be closed by 31 August 2007.104  This closure 
is intended to reduce the number of refugees coming under the influence of the Taliban, 
while using Pakistan’s Afghan refugee camps as a safe haven.  However, a U.N. survey 
reported in January 2007 its finding that 57 percent of Afghans did not want to return to 
their traditional homeland.105 
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D. PAKISTAN’S INEFFECTIVE MADRASSA REFORMS 
Enlightened moderation is all part of the sound bites used by Pakistan’s 
military government to appease the Americans.  It tries to pretend that the 
Musharraf government is holding back the hordes of fanatics and 
terrorists, and if his government was not there, the country would be 
overrun.  All Muslim dictators and autocrats are supposedly fighting 
terrorists and automatically when they are fighting terrorists then they 
become moderates. So this term is really part of this whole propaganda to 
propagate themselves as some sort of liberals and moderates.  How can a 
military dictatorship be considered liberal and moderate? 106 
—Parliamentarian Imran Khan 
Pakistan’s reforms thus far have yielded little change in the operation of 
madrassas in Pakistan, particularly those bordering Afghanistan.  The 2002 Education 
Sector Reforms (ESR) program, aimed at reforming the country’s ailing education system 
is a comprehensive framework for improved literacy, school access, curriculum 
development, and of course, madrassa reform.  However, almost five years later, these 
reforms still face numerous obstacles, among them; money, bureaucracy, and religious 
influence.  In the case of funding, Pakistan has pledged to increase the budget for 
education to 4 percent of GDP from the current 2 percent. To reach this goal, the 
government will need an additional $7.9 billion, of which it expects $4.4 billion to come 
from foreign aid.107  The recommendations of the Education Sector Reforms cover both 
the madrassas system and the formal education system.  They provide a broad range of 
solutions to the education woes of Pakistan and will be funded both domestically and 
through international aid.  The recommendations specific to the madrassas are as follows: 
• Begin teaching formal subjects at the madrassas 
• Help the madrassas join the education mainstream through the 
provision of grants, salaries to teachers, cost of textbooks, teacher 
training and equipment. 
• Formal subjects, English, Math, Social/Pakistan Studies and General 
Science should be introduced at the primary, middle, and secondary 
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levels, while English, Economics, Pakistan Studies and Computer 
Science will be introduced at the intermediate level. 
• Incentives to madrassas have been provided to 140 at secondary level 
and 200 at intermediate level. 
• The Government of Pakistan, from its own budget resources, is 
implementing this plan.108 
Regardless of these reform plans, Pakistan’s education system is teetering on the 
brink of collapse.  It is incredible that Pakistan is one of only twelve world countries that 
spend less than 2 percent of its GNP on education and yet it is one of the few countries 
with nuclear weapon technology.  The World Bank reports that the average Pakistani boy 
receives only five years of schooling and the average girl just 2.5 years.  The U.N. 
Development Program’s 2004 Human Development Report assigns Pakistan the lowest 
“education index” of any country outside Africa.109 
In a recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Samina 
Ahmed, South Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group, stated that the Musharraf 
government has publicly acknowledged the problem and made education reform a 
centerpiece of its modernization drive, but has failed to follow through.  In January 2002, 
the government launched its Education Sector Reforms (ESR) program, aimed at 
reforming the education system.  She believes that there are three main obstacles 
remaining. First, that the government of Pakistan is reluctant to divert more of its own 
resources to education. To meet its commitment to raise education funding to 4 percent, 
the government will need an estimated $7.9 billion.   However, the government expects 
55 percent of this, an estimated $4.4 billion to come from foreign donors, symbolizing an 
unwillingness to invest its own resources in education reform.  Secondly, Pakistan’s 
public education bureaucracy is both highly centralized and inefficient.  As in many 
developing nations, appointments are based on politics rather than merit within the sector,  
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thereby severely impairing the quality of teaching. And finally, the government has 
repeatedly yielded to political pressure from religious parties that have openly opposed 
education and madrassa reform.110 
Christine Fair, of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), takes an equally 
insightful look at the current reform efforts, and concludes that Islamabad’s efforts to 
counter militancy have been effective to the degree that Pakistan has enforced its own 
restrictions.111  She believes that there is no evidence to suggest that Pakistan has made a 
strategic decision to abandon militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and, by extension, 
unlikely to take the necessary steps to reform the madrassas and stem the flow of 
militants onto the battlefield.  The streams of young madrassa graduates, with little 
alternative careers available, often find themselves involved in a proxy war against India 
in Kashmir.  This enables Musharraf to maintain the current forces in Kashmir, 
augmented by proxy fighters from the madrassas, which keeps the Indian Army occupied 
without major resource expenditure. She argues that Islamabad will attempt to maintain 
this reserve capability while seeking to restrict their activities to a threshold that will not 
prompt Indian, U.S., or other international response.112 
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN 
1. Bridging the Gulf Between the Madrassas and the Public Schools  
Regardless of its ultimate intentions, the Government of Pakistan remains 
outwardly committed to ensure improved access to physical assets, education, vocational 
skills, training, and other education services that enhance the human capital of the poor 
and enable them to generate income through asset utilization and gainful employment. 
The Ministry of Education has taken a close stock of the implementation of the Education 
Sector Reforms (ESR) aimed at bringing improvement in all aspects of education.113 
Some of the critical targets of the ESR are listed below: 
• 10 percent increase in primary school-aged children in target districts. 
• 37,000 teachers and education administrators trained.  
• 60 percent of teachers trained will meet the standards. 
• Approximately 10 percent improvement in student performance/year.  
• 49,500 people completing USAID sponsored literacy programs.114 
Although the madrassas clearly need reform, the dismal state of Pakistan’s public 
education system, which educates the majority of children, should be overhauled first, 
otherwise madrassa reform is analogous to rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.  
Any effort to even address the madrassa syllabus to bring it in line with the mainstream 
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2. Communication with the Mullahs—Dealing with the Opposition 
In September 2004, President Musharraf came together with the heads of five 
main madrassa boards under the Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris-e-Deenia (ITMD).  He 
persuaded them to register the madrassas and to introduce “secular” subjects.116  This 
was considered a breakthrough at the time and the government hoped that this would 
break the cycle of ignorance, poverty, and unemployment that pushes students to 
extremism.  In turn, the government conceded that the madrassas’ degrees would be 
made equivalent to those of the formal education system and they would come under the 
control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, rather than the Ministry of Education.  
However, as is often the case, the ground truth reflects a different reality.  “Jihad,” says 
Qari Hanif Jullundhari, the Multan-based general secretary of the Wafaqul Madaris, “is a 
central tenet of Islam and we will never shy away from teaching it.” The Wafaqul 
Madaris is the largest and most influential of the five madrassa boards and follows the 
strict Deobandi school of thought.117  There are actually three Sunni madrassa boards—
Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadees, and Barelvi, one for the Shia, and the supra-sectarian Jamaat 
Islamia (JI).118 
The highly centralized bureaucracy in Pakistan’s education system is also 
problematic.  Appointments are based on politics rather than merit, which impair the 
quality of teaching and inhibit change. In addition, this centralized control further 
prevents effective monitoring over public school teachers and administrators.  The South 
Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group (ISG), Dr. Samina Ahmed, cited 
the most damning evidence in the April 2005 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Hearing.  She claims that the Pakistani government has repeatedly yielded to political 
pressure from political parties that have openly opposed education and madrassa reform.  
At this time it appears that Pakistan is attempting to restrict the activities of the religious  
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factions operating within its territory only to a threshold that will not prompt an Indian or 
U.S. response, and that will ensure continued funding of reform programs by U.S. non-
governmental organizations.119 
The Government of Pakistan’s capitulation to the religious right on education 
reform stems from its reliance on them to counter its civilian secular opposition. 120  The 
MMA presently controls the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) government and 
governs Balochistan in alliance with the Muslim League.  MMA officials head the 
provincial education ministries of both these provinces and have publicly opposed the 
reform of the public school sector.121  Even domestically, many view Musharraf’s 
rhetoric against extremism and his promises to stamp out militant groups merely as a 
façade—a veneer for the benefit of its Western sponsors.  The President of Pakistan’s 
Federation of Journalists, Mazhar Abbas, believes that President Musharraf is not 
targeting groups fighting in Kashmir, because tomorrow he may need them.  That is why, 
he believes, neither Hafiz Saeed, Chief of Lashker-e-Taiba, Masood Azhar, Head of 
Jaish-e-Mohammad or Commander Mohammad Salahuddin, Chief of Hizbul Mujahideen 
have been arrested.122 
Not only are the reforms unwelcome at the local level, but they are undesirable at 
the political level also.  Hussain Haqqani, the former Pakistani Ambassador to Sri Lanka, 
offers this insight,  
Musharraf is using the upsurge in Islamism to justify his continued 
military dictatorship. The choice Musharraf is presenting to the world, is 
between him and a nuclear-armed Islamist state, a choice that has all but 
silenced U.S. pressure for Musharraf to reinstate democracy. [In addition] 
Musharraf deliberately treats the Islamist parties with kid gloves because 
they have historically been supportive of military dictatorships in return  
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for complete autonomy in operating their madrassas and other institutions. 
By giving them free reign, Musharraf thus adds to his domestic support 
base.123 
This is a clear example of the complexity of the issue.  President Musharraf has 
often be castigated for his country’s support in the war on terror, many contending that he 
could do far more to combat extremism and also be more forthcoming in intelligence 
matters related to the location of senior Al Qaeda leadership. However, as Haqqani 
implies, the President walks a tightrope between domestic political reform and domestic 
religious reform; both at the behest of the United States. 
3. Education Reform and the Private School Model 
Thus far we have established that the state-run public schools (as opposed to the 
fee-charging private schools) are also in need of curriculum reform to change textbooks 
and bring them more in line with the more efficient private schools.  So perhaps the 
elusive solution is to expand Pakistan’s private school sector in order to graduate students 
ready to engage the global economy in a meaningful way.  Obviously, sending all of 
Pakistan’s students to private school is a non-starter, and some form of reform will be 
necessary at the madrassas and public school system level in order to cater to the poorer 
echelon of Pakistani society.  However, expanding the fundamentals of the private school 
system may resolve many of the issues discussed.  For example, if the millions of dollars 
spent by the governments of Pakistan and the United States are used to establish schools 
that operated under the same principles as private schools (i.e., a broad curriculum, 
contract teachers, and so on) the ramifications would be very positive.  In fact, these 
schools would be far less likely to promote extremism than government public schools or 
madrassas, since these would tend to attract students by virtue of their low or nonexistent 
out-of-pocket costs to parents.124  President Musharraf could expect resistance to these 
measures, most notably from the clerics; however, the increase in popular support on the 
street would most likely offset this loss if support. The total external developmental aid 
for education in Pakistan was more than $1.5 billion dollars in recent years (see table 
below).  The suggestion to mirror the private school system instead of revamping the 
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public and madrassa systems, which are rife with jingoism and extremist elements, might 
be feasible, given a redirection of the resources described below. 
 
Table 7.   External Development Assistance in the Education Sector. 
From: Economic Survey 2005–2006.125 
The poor economic situation in Pakistan lies at the heart of most of the country’s 
internal problems.  Improvements in the domestic economy would alleviate many of the 
reasons poorer Pakistanis send their children to madrassas.  Economic progress would 
also provide alternatives for the young school graduates and enable them to avoid the 
draw of extremism, which is preached as a panacea for all the country’s ailments. Dr. 
Looney of the Naval Postgraduate School believes that the losses to Pakistan’s economy 
associated with the September 11 attacks and the Afghan crisis are estimated at $2.5 to $3 
billion.126 
Another alternative is to develop technical or trade schools as an alternative to the 
madrassas. This option would give the graduates a skill with which they could earn a 
living, support a family, and most importantly stay out of the clutches of militant 
recruiters preying on those with few life skills and even less hope for the future.  
                                                 
125 “Economic Survey 2005–2006, 12,” http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/sur_chap_05-06/11-
education.PDF (accessed 27 Jan 2007). 
126 Robert Looney, “A U.S. Strategy for Achieving Stability in Pakistan: Expanding Educational 
Opportunities,” Strategic Insights, Volume I, Issue 7, Sep 2002. 
50 
A U.S. policy approach to improve the human capital of young Pakistanis would 
have the long-term effect of enhancing the economy of Pakistan.  This in turn would 
yield better relations with India, since the number of fighters in Kashmir would diminish 
as a result of better opportunities in the cities.   Improved relations with India could allow 
the Government of Pakistan to spend less on defense, and more on education.  Islamabad 
spent nearly $16 on defense for every $1 spent on education in 2004.127  Even a slight 
change in this ratio would yield a dramatic result for the young people of Pakistan. 
The short-term goals of the GWOT, to capture or kill the Al Qaeda senior 
leadership, have been rather successful in Pakistan.  In a visit to CENTCOM in 
September 2005, President Musharraf described the efforts Pakistan has made in the War 
on Terror and drew an important distinction between terrorism and extremism for his 
U.S. audience. 
Terrorism and extremism are two separate issues. While terrorism can be 
dealt with military force, extremism has to be confronted with a strategy to 
change the hearts and the minds of the people. So there is the requirement 
to evolve a strategy suitable to the environment in which we are 
operating.128 
This statement highlights two important issues.  One, that the President actively 
recognizes that the problem of extremism is fundamentally different in nature from that 
of terrorism and two, that the immediate goals of the War on Terror are twofold—to 
address terrorism first, and then the causal extremism second.  The point is, eliminating 
terrorists in Pakistan, and elsewhere, is a short-term solution to the linked problems of 
terrorism and extremism. For example, when the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, was killed in June 2006, he was quickly replaced by one of his “lieutenants,” 
Abu Hamza al-Muhajer.129 It is not unreasonable then, to expect that once bin Ladin and 
al-Zawahiri are captured or killed, they will quickly be replaced and the War on Terror 
will march onwards. In this sense, the War on Terror cannot logically ever end.  There 
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will be triumphs and failures, but the recruiting process of Al Qaeda is such that there 
appears to be a boundless pool of willing “jihadists” ready to take up arms against the 
West in general, and the United States in particular. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES  
1. Saudi Arabian Influence 
From a strategic perspective, any madrassa reform by Pakistan, with or without 
American assistance, should address the Saudi Arabian financial backing prior to 
instituting any reorganization.  Yes, it is necessary to reform the madrassas in Pakistan, 
but without addressing the continued funding from Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent, 
the Gulf Countries, any reform effort is doomed to failure.  Unfortunately, this issue is 
politically treacherous since the United Sates and Saudi Arabia are so closely linked 
economically.  America is dependent on Saudi Arabia for oil, but in return, the House of 
Saud is reliant on America for protection and continued arms supplies.  Since 1979, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has spent more than $50 billion on U.S. military purchases, 
including five airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and a $5.6 billion “peace 
shield”—a state-of-the-art command and control system for the Royal Saudi Air Force 
with six underground command centers linking 147 defense-related sites.130 
Indeed, some have argued that an international conglomerate known as the 
Carlyle Group, with senior advisors including George Bush Senior and former British 
Prime Minister John Major, has a key role in maintaining close ties with Saudi Arabia 
regardless of the political cost.131  Also noteworthy, former C.I.A. officials have even 
claimed that the war in Iraq was a diversion to draw public attention from the true 
financiers of terrorism, Saudi Arabia. This seemingly outlandish claim has certainly 
brought ex-C.I.A. operative-turned-author Robert Baer much media attention; however, 
his twenty-plus years of experience in the Middle East and Central Asia lend him some 
credibility and make his claims difficult to disregard out of hand.  Incidentally, he also 
claims that the Saudi Royal Family, the House of Saud, continues to fund violent 
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fundamentalists through Islamic charities to avoid the wrath of these extremists.132  
These conspiracy-like theories are very difficult to evaluate for accuracy, yet his 
statement that 15 of the 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001, hailed from Saudi Arabia, 
not Iraq or Afghanistan, is undeniable. 
The October 2002 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Report on terrorist 
financing concluded that, “For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia 
have been the most important source of funds for al Qaeda; and for years, Saudi officials 
have turned a blind eye to this problem.”133  The Saudi Arabian Government’s response 
is interesting.  According to Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Kingdom’s Ambassador to the 
United States: “Government officials who are privy to current law enforcement efforts 
know and appreciate the close cooperation the United States and Saudi Arabia have in the 
War on Terrorism.  The Task Force is clearly out of touch with current activities.”134  
The CFR updated their report in 2004, and addressed the Saudi response to their previous 
findings:  
The Task Force appreciates the necessary delicacies of diplomacy and 
notes that previous administrations also used phrases that obfuscated more 
than they illuminated when making public statements on this subject. 
Nevertheless, when U.S. spokespersons are only willing to say that “Saudi 
Arabia is being cooperative” when they know very well all the ways in 
which it is not, both our allies and adversaries can be forgiven for 
believing that the United States does not place a high priority on this 
issue.135 
 
With regard to the madrassas issue, the Task Force concluded that:  
Foreign funding of extremist madrassas in Pakistan alone, for example, is 
estimated in the tens of millions, much of it historically from Saudi 
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Arabia. Saudi patronage has played an important role in promoting jihadi 
culture in Pakistan, including through extensive assistance to Ahl-e Hadith 
(Salifi/Wahabi) madrassas. More than a million young Pakistanis are 
educated in these madrassas, according to a recent report cosponsored by 
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society.136 Islamic 
religious schools in Afghanistan, India, Yemen, Africa, Central Asia, the 
Balkans (particularly Bosnia and Kosovo), North America, Chechnya, and 
Dagestan are also significantly financed by Saudi sources.137 
Since this report was published in 2004, the governments of Saudi Arabia and 
America have increasingly worked together to deal with the terrorist financing emanating 
from the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.  These efforts have reduced the flow of money to 
organizations like Al-Qaeda, but much remains to be done in reducing the funding of 
international madrassas that focus on and teach the narrow-minded Islamic views of 
Wahhabism. 
2. Financial Assistance 
The United States should increase its commitment to the future of Pakistan by 
increasing the monetary assistance provided to the government of Pakistan to reform the 
country’s education system.  The madrassas remain a lightning rod for criticism, and 
allegations of U.S. meddling in the internal affairs of an Islamic country fuel the fatwas 
issued against the West.  Perhaps the solution is to draw the students away from the 
madrassas by enhancing the public education system to such a degree that the madrassas 
no longer hold any allure to the poor in Pakistan.  This approach could be introduced and 
advertised in such a manner as to maximize the perception of U.S. policies in Pakistan 
and may counter much of the negative press encountered as a result of the war on terror.  
The root problem of the madrassas system is not the extremist element pushing a 
message filled with hatred for the West; the root of the problem lies with the students and 
the lack of a viable alternative available to their parents.  The decision to send one’s child 
to an institution that will not prepare the child for the future is driven by poverty, not an 
urge to enhance the child’s spiritual development. The vast majority of Pakistanis must 
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choose between a deteriorated public school system that can be physically difficult to 
access, and religious schools that will feed, clothe, and oftentimes house their children for 
free.138  To tackle the madrassa problem in Pakistan, the underlying poverty must be 
addressed. The assistance provided by the United States, currently $100 million for 
education reform, must be dramatically increased.  The aid to Pakistan’s public education 
system will eventually yield better schools and more graduates more prepared for the 
global marketplace.  The opening of hundreds of new public schools, and the 
refurbishment of existing schools, will draw potential students away from the madrassas, 
and back into the mainstream where English, science, and mathematics take precedence 
over rote memorization of the Koran.  Those students wishing to pursue a religious 
education could attend any number of state-sponsored, state-registered madrassas, with 
appropriate oversight of curriculum, funding, and accreditation.  
The power of the country’s religious conservatives would naturally be diminished 
under such a proposal and, as such, they could be expected to be united in opposition to 
any major educational reforms.  This is perhaps the basis for the perception that President 
Musharraf is unwilling to deliver concrete results in his education reforms.  Should the 
president enact many of the ESR proposals, the religious conservatives may well oust 
him from office through the electoral process or otherwise.  A potential solution here is to 
co-opt the opposition to education reform by giving them a stake in the new institutions 
in the public realm. 
Currently, USAID has allocated $100 million over five years to Pakistan’s 
education sector, aimed at teacher training, engendering democratic ideas, improving the 
quality of exams, and enabling greater access to schools.  The U.S. government has a 
stake in the direction and outcome of educational reform and should adopt a more 
proactive approach.139  This amount is not nearly enough to attain these lofty goals.  As 
an example, the United States spent upwards to $4 billion in the proxy war against the 
Soviets between 1979 and 1989.  The more nebulous threat facing the United States in 
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the region today requires an equal commitment in order to stabilize the country and 
reassure the people of Pakistan that America’s pledge is strategic and long-lasting. 
The United States should avoid the most direct approach—that is, to urge the 
Pakistan government to close the madrassas linked to propagating violence.  The 
religious factions would obviously see the United States as behind the effort and may 
attempt to use it as a catalyst for a holy war that would risk toppling the existing regime.  
Closure of the schools, at the behest of the Washington, would be seen across society as a 
move on Islam.140 As the noted historian William Dalrymple comments, attempting to 
shut down all the madrassas would be tantamount to instructing Muslims to stop 
educating themselves about their religion—hardly the best strategy for winning hearts 
and minds.141  
3. Perception Management 
During the Islamic Golden Age, philosophers, scientists, and engineers of the 
Islamic world contributed enormously to technology, both by preserving earlier traditions 
and by adding their own inventions and innovations. Scientific and intellectual 
achievements blossomed in the Golden age.142  The United States could advance its 
educational reform support in conjunction with the government of Pakistan to promote a 
return to the Golden age of Islam, a desire much espoused by Islamic fundamentalists.  
This “fundamental” reform should pledge to lessen the disparity between the West and 
the Islamic world by a mutually agreed-upon framework for development of Pakistan’s 
scientific and technological institutions in order to propel Pakistan from its current state 
into the twenty-first century.  
To this end, the White House has reportedly approved a new secret strategy 
dubbed the Muslim World Outreach.  This program marks the first time that the U.S. 
Government has indicated that it has an interest in influencing what happens within 
Islam, and obviously raises questions, such as the Constitutional separation of Church 
and State.  Be that as it may, the plan is intended to promote shared values of democracy, 
                                                 
140 P. W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,” Analysis Paper 
#14, Nov 2001, 6. 
141 William Dalrymple, “Inside Islam’s ‘terror schools.’” 28 Mar 2005, 7, 
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women’s rights, and tolerance, and as such, calls for moderate Muslim nations and 
reform groups to act as intermediaries.  This war of ideas is being managed by the CIA 
and aims to actively “target” Islamic media, religious leaders, and political parties. 
According to reports, the CIA is receiving “an exponential increase in money, people, 
and assets” to help it influence Muslim societies, says a senior intelligence official.143 
Figure 1 below provides a clear depiction of the scope of Washington’s ambition. 
 
Figure 1.   Going Global 
From: U.S. News & World Report, 25 Apr 2005.144 
                                                 
143 David E. Kaplan, “Hearts, Minds, and Dollars,” U.S. News & World Report, 25 Apr 2005, 2, 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050425/25roots_2.htm (accessed 28 Jan 2007). 
144 Ibid. 
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Understandably, this endeavor is viewed with suspicion by many Muslims and 
confirms previous distrust for U.S. foreign policy and the activities of the CIA.  In 
reference to the Muslim World Outreach program, an Al Jazeera article recently 
concluded “it confirms that discrediting Mohammed PBUH has become a top priority and 
a pre-requisite of the so-called war on terrorism. Such clear admissions from the anti-
Islam fascists cannot be interpreted in any positive way.”145 
Pakistan is at a turning point in its history.  Should President Musharraf decide to 
make the tough choices and reform the entire educational system, not just the madrassas, 
Pakistan has a chance of catching up with the globalized world.  Conversely, a poorly 
administered education reform policy, regardless of intentions, will relegate Pakistan’s 
youth to a future void of meaningful opportunities and pave the way for the downward 
spiral into further radicalism. 
The War on Terror is a noble effort to rid the world of those who, in the words of 
President Bush, “cannot stand freedom … [and] do not believe in free speech, free 
religion, free dissent, do not believe in women's rights, and have a desire to impose their 
ideology on much of the world.”146  But the terrorism we seek to destroy is a symptom of 
a greater ailment that is Islamic extremism.  Al Qaeda and other Islamic groups could not 
survive were it not for the continued financial support of Saudi Arabia.  As one noted 
scholar put it, “Washington’s failure even to acknowledge this problem, [Saudi support] 
is the greatest failure of our anti-terror campaign to date, one that not even the removal of 
Saddam Hussein will repair. No lasting progress in the war on terrorism can be expected 
unless and until we deny the fanatics their lifeline.”147 
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